The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1990/90_143/90_143.c1

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Subject: 90-143 -- CONCUR, CONNECTICUT v. DOEHR




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 90-143



CONNECTICUT and JOHN F. DIGIOVANNI, PETITIONERS v. BRIAN K. DOEHR

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second
circuit

[June 6, 1991]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring.
    I agree with the Court that the Connecticut attachment statute, "as
applied in this case," ante p. 1, fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  I therefore join Parts I, II and III of its
opinion.  Unfortunately, the remainder of the Court's opinion does not
confine itself to the facts of this case, but enters upon a lengthy
disquisition as to what combination of safeguards are required to satisfy
Due Process in hypothetical cases not before the Court.  I therefore do not
join Part IV.
    As the Court's opinion points out, the Connecticut statute allows
attachment not merely for a creditor's claim, but for a tort claim of
assault and battery; it affords no opportunity for a pre-deprivation
hearing; it contains no requirement that there be "exigent circumstances,"
such as an effort on the part of the defendant to conceal assets; no bond
is required from the plaintiff; and the property attached is one in which
the plaintiff has no pre-existing interest.  The Court's opinion is, in my
view, ultimately correct when it bases its holding of unconstitutionality
of the Connecticut statute as applied here on our cases of Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, --- U. S.
--- (1972), Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 460 U. S. 600 (1974), and North
Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975).  But I do not
believe that the result follows so inexorably as the Court's opinion
suggests.  All of the cited cases dealt with personalty -- bank deposits or
chattels -- and each involved the physical seizure of the property itself,
so that the defendant was deprived of its use.  These cases, which
represented something of a revolution in the jurisprudence of procedural
due process, placed substantial limits on the methods by which creditors
could obtain a lien on the assets of a debtor prior to judgment.  But in
all of them the debtor was deprived of the use and possession of the
property.  In the present case, on the other hand, Connecticut's
pre-judgment attachment on real property statute, which secures an
incipient lien for the plaintiff, does not deprive the defendant of the use
or possession of the property.
    The Court's opinion therefore breaks new ground, and I would point out,
more emphatically than the Court does, the limits of today's holding.  In
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz.
1973), the District Court held that the filing of a mechanics' lien did not
cause the deprivation of a significant property interest of the owner.  We
summarily affirmed that decision.  417 U. S. 1901 (1974).  Other courts
have read this summary affirmance to mean that the mere imposition of a
lien on real property, which does not disturb the owner's use or enjoyment
of the property, is not a deprivation of property calling for procedural
due process safeguards.  I agree with the Court, however, that upon
analysis the deprivation here is a significant one, even though the owner
remains in undisturbed possession.  "For a property owner like Doehr,
attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or
otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the
chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even
place an existing mortgage in technical default when there is an insecurity
clause."  Ante, p. 8.  Given the elaborate system of title records relating
to real property which prevails in all of our states, a lienor need not
obtain possession or use of real property belonging to a debtor in order to
significantly impair its value to him.
    But in Spielman-Fond, Inc., supra, there was, as the Court points out
in fn. 9, ante, an alternate basis available to this Court for affirmance
of that decision.  Arizona recognized a pre-existing lien in favor of
unpaid mechanics and materialmen who had contributed labor or supplies
which were incorporated in improvements to real property.  The existence of
such a lien upon the very property ultimately posted or noticed
distinguishes those cases from the present one, where the plaintiff had no
pre-existing interest in the real property which he sought to attach.
Materialman's and mechanic's lien statutes award an interest in real
property to workers who have contributed their labor, and to suppliers who
have furnished material, for the improvement of the real property.  Since
neither the labor nor the material can be reclaimed once it has become a
part of the realty, this is the only method by which workmen or small
businessmen who have contributed to the improvement of the property may be
given a remedy against a property owner who has defaulted on his promise to
pay for the labor and the materials.  To require any sort of a contested
court hearing or bond before the notice of lien takes effect would largely
defeat the purpose of these statutes.
    Petitioner in its brief relies in part on our summary affirmance in
Bartlett v. Williams, 464 U. S. 801 (1983).  That case involved a lis
pendens, in which the question presented to this Court was whether such a
procedure could be valid when the only protection afforded to the owner of
land affected by the lis pendens was a post-sequestration hearing.  A
notice of lis pendens is a well established traditional remedy whereby a
plaintiff (usually a judgment creditor) who brings an action to enforce an
interest in property to which the defendant has title gives notice of the
pendency of such action to third parties; the notice causes the interest
which he establishes, if successful, to relate back to the date of the
filing of the lis pendens.  The filing of such notice will have an effect
upon the defendant's ability to alienate the property, or to obtain
additional security on the basis of title to the property, but the effect
of the lis pendens is simply to give notice to the world of the remedy
being sought in the lawsuit itself.  The lis pendens itself creates no
additional right in the property on the part of the plaintiff, but simply
allows third parties to know that a lawsuit is pending in which the
plaintiff is seeking to establish such a right.  Here, too, the fact that
the plaintiff already claims an interest in the property which he seeks to
enforce by a lawsuit distinguishes this class of cases from the Connecticut
attachment employed in the present case.
    Today's holding is a significant development in the law; the only cases
dealing with real property cited in the Court's opinion, Peralta v. Heights
Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 85 (1988), and Hodge v. Muscatine
County, 196 U. S. 276, 281 (1905), arose out of lien foreclosure sales in
which the question was whether the owner was entitled to proper notice.
The change is dramatically reflected when we compare today's decision with
the almost casual statement of Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous
Court in Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 31 (1928):
"[N]othing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be
creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its
effect upon the result of the suit."

The only protection accorded to the debtor in that case was the right to
contest his liability in a post-deprivation proceeding.
    It is both unwise and unnecessary, I believe, for the Court to proceed,
as it does in Part IV, from its decision of the case before it to discuss
abstract and hypothetical situations not before it.  This is especially so
where we are dealing with the Due Process Clause which, as the Court
recognizes, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances, ante, p. 7.  And
it is even more true in a case involving constitutional limits on the
methods by which the states may transfer or create interests in real
property; in other areas of the law, dicta may do little damage, but those
who insure titles or write title opinions often do not enjoy the luxury of
distinguishing detween dicta and holding.
    The two elements of due process with which the Court concerns itself in
Part IV -- the requirement of a bond, and of "exigent circumstances" --
prove to be upon analysis so vague that the discussion is not only
unnecessary, but not particulary useful.  Unless one knows what the terms
and conditions of a bond are to be, the requirement of a "bond" in the
abstract means little.  The amount to be secured by the bond and the
conditions of the bond are left unaddressed -- is there to be liability on
the part of a plaintiff if he is ultimately unsuccessful in the underlying
lawsuit, or is it instead to be conditioned on some sort of good faith
test?  The "exigent circumstances" referred to by the Court are admittedly
equally vague; non-residency appears to be enough in some states, an
attempt to conceal assets is required in others, an effort to flee the
jurisdiction in still others.  We should await concrete cases which present
questions involving bonds and exigent circumstances before we attempt to
decide when and if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires them as prerequisites for a lawful attachment.

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